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== Release Notes ==
== Release Notes ==
Revision as of 07:50, 11 January 2018
Strong crypto settings
This change is about updating the current system-wide crypto policy to disable legacy and unused cryptographic protocols.
- Name: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Email: <firstname.lastname@example.org>
- Release notes owner:
- Targeted release: Fedora 28
- Last updated: 2018-01-11
- Tracker bug: <will be assigned by the Wrangler>
Fedora includes several cryptographic components who's security doesn't remain constant over time. Algorithms such as (cryptographic) hashing and encryption typically have a lifetime after which they are considered either too risky to use or plain insecure. That would mean we need to phase out such algorithms from the default settings, or completely disable if they could cause irreparable issue.
While in the past we did not disable algorithms in a consistent way (different applications utilized different policies), today we have a system-wide policy followed by a large part of Fedora components. That allows us to move consistently and deprecate algorithms system-wide. For rationale see RFC 7457 for a more complete list of attacks taking advantage of legacy crypto algorithms.
The propose changes for default policy are:
* Keep only TLS 1.2 (and TLS 1.3 when available) as enabled protocols and move the TLS 1.x, x<=1 to legacy level. * Require finite field parameters (RSA, Diffie-Hellman) of 2048 and more in the default settings
That is a policy of:
LEGACY MACs: All HMAC with SHA1 or better + all modern MACs (poly1305 etc) Curves: all prime >= 255 bits (including bernstein curves) Signature algorithms: SHA-1 hash or better (not RIPEMD) Ciphers: all available > 112-bit key, >= 128-bit block (no rc4, but with 3DES) key exchange: ECDHE, RSA, DHE DH params size: >=1024 RSA params size: >=1024 TLS protocols: TLS >= 1.0
DEFAULT MACs: All HMAC with SHA1 or better + all modern MACs (poly1305 etc) Curves: all prime >= 255 bits (including bernstein curves) Signature algorithms: with SHA-1 hash or better Ciphers: >= 128-bit key, >= 128-bit block (aes, camellia, chacha20, including aes-cbc) key exchange: ECDHE, RSA, DHE DH params size: >= 2048 RSA params size: >= 2048 TLS protocols: TLS >= 1.2
FUTURE MACs: All HMAC with SHA256 or better + all modern MACs (poly1305 etc) Curves: all prime >= 384 bits (including bernstein curves) Signature algorithms: SHA-384 hash or better Ciphers: >= 256-bit key, >= 128-bit block, only Authenticated Encryption (AE) ciphers key exchange: ECDHE, DHE DH params size: >= 3072 RSA params size: >= 3072 TLS protocols: TLS >= 1.2
Benefit to Fedora
With this change we protect users from relying on enabled-by-default weak cryptography, as well as reduce our maintenance cost for future attacks that rely on weak crypto for exploitation.
- Proposal owners:
The policies include in crypto-policies package need to be updated.
- Other developers:
* Crypto policies are updated to the settings above * OpenSSL is updated to allow setting policies for TLS versions
- Release engineering: #7235 (a check of an impact with Release Engineering is needed)
* Crypto policies are updated to the settings above * OpenSSL, NSS, GnuTLS and all applications covered under the Fedora Crypto Policies follow the new crypto settings.
- Policies and guidelines:
No changes to packaging or other guidelines is needed.
- Trademark approval: N/A (not needed for this Change)
It may be that the new settings break software that connects to servers which utilize weak algorithms. Compatibility can be obtained by switching the system to legacy mode.
How To Test
Applications which follow the system-wide policy (e.g., curl,wget) should be tested:
* whether they can connect to legacy (TLS1.0, TLS1.1) servers when system is in legacy mode * whether the previous connection breaks when system is in default mode * whether the system can connect to TLS 1.2 servers when in default, legacy or future mode.
Given the existing deployment of TLS 1.2 on the internet, there should not be significant user experience degradation, although that's a speculation.
* nss * gnutls * openssl * crypto-policies
- Contingency mechanism: (What to do? Who will do it?)
If we notice significant user experience degradation, e.g., due to many custom servers utilizing legacy protocols, we should consider postponing that change. The change owner will take care of this.
If the openssl changes to support a system-wide policy do not merge on upstream in time, the change will be postponed. The change owner will take care of this.
- Contingency deadline: beta freeze
- Blocks release? No